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Abstract
The legal framework to fighting corruption has been less 
effective probably because it is evidence-based. This study 
investigated the extent to which whistleblowing predicted 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score, the extent to 
which employees engaged in whistleblowing, and why 
they did not report cases of corruption. Respondents 
were 536 employees (298 males; 238 females) sampled 
from public organizations in southwestern Nigeria. 
Their ages averaged 32.13 (SD =9.78). Results of the 
simple regression indicated that the country’s CPI score 
significantly increased with whistleblowing. Results of 
the χ2 test indicated that majority of the respondents 
were discouraged from blowing the whistle because of 
social and psychological factors such as the feelings that 
whistleblowing would not bring desired change, fear of 
being ostracized, the perceived stress associated with 
being a witness to corrupt acts, perceived inefficiency 
of the court process, the perceived clumsiness in the 
whistleblowing process, the feelings that corrupt persons 
were too powerful, and the feelings that corruption had 
no direct victims. There were no gender differences 
in the effect of the social and psychological factors 
in whistleblowing. Similarly, there were no gender 
differences in the frequency of whistleblowing from 
2001 to 2012. However, in the 2013 (January to June) 
significant gender differences occurred in the frequency 
of whistleblowing with more females engaging in 
whistleblowing than males. Implications of the findings 
for theory and research were discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Corrupt ion has  remained a  major  chal lenge to 
development in most developing countries. An analysis 
of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a measure of 
perceived level of public sector corruption in countries 
and territories around the world (TI, 2012), indicates that 
Nigeria, for example, consistently occupied appalling 
positions in the list of most corrupt countries in the world 
between 2001 and 2012 (TI, 2013). One cannot but 
question the effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance of 
the Nigeria anti-corruption agencies such as Economic 
and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), Independent 
Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC), and Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), if one 
analyzes the country’s ranking on the CPI and the number 
of corruption cases effectively prosecuted by the anti-
corruption agencies. These agencies focus more on the 
legal framework to fighting corruption; believing that 
when corrupt individuals are prosecuted and convicted, it 
would deter others from engaging in corruption. 
The inability of the legal framework to effectively 
reduce corruption in Nigeria may be associated with 
the low number of corruption cases successfully 
prosecuted. For example, between May 2001 and July 
2005, ICPC filed 49 cases involving 104 individuals but 
was able to conclude just one (ICPC, 2005). Two quick 
questions come to mind. One, does this imply that only 
104 individuals were corrupt in Nigeria? Two, is it an 
indication that only one Nigerian was guilty of corruption 
in the period under investigation? 
The legal framework to fighting corruption is evidence-
based and the questions underscore the challenges 
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associated with the framework. Suspected cases of 
corruption must be reported by the citizens, investigated 
by the appropriate government agencies, and prosecuted 
by courts of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of the legal framework may be predicated on 
the quality of the employees’ reports of corrupt practices. 
Most studies on corruption in Nigeria focused political 
solutions (Egwemi, 2012; Enweremadu, 2012), financial 
accountability (Ezeani, 2012), and politico-economic 
solutions e.g. privatization and liberalization (Adeyemo, 
2005). However, Odeh (2011) reported that privatization 
was another source of corruption in Nigeria. 
Whistleblowing, an act of disclosure by members of 
an organization of illegal and immoral acts perpetrated 
by the organization and organization members to persons 
or organizations that may bring about a change (Rehg, 
Miceli, Near & Van Scotter, 2008), is increasingly being 
recognized as an important tool in the prevention and 
detection of corruption and other immoral malpractices 
(TI, 2010). Oakley and White (2006) submitted that anti-
corruption campaigns may not be successful without 
effective whistleblowing. No adequate research effort 
has investigated extent to which employees engage in 
whistleblowing in Nigeria: a lacuna this study aimed to 
fill. An understanding of this lacuna would help create 
the appropriate atmosphere for building the needed 
attitude that would aid whistleblowing among employees 
in Nigeria. 
The importance of whistleblowing in the drive for a 
corruption-free society is underscored by the fact that the 
institutional mechanisms put in place to check corruption 
may not be effective without whistleblowing, especially 
from insiders who identify and draw attention to corrupt 
acts that other mechanisms may fail to pick up (Oakley 
& White, 2006). However, lack of support from others 
may render institutional mechanisms against corruption 
ineffective and hinder whistleblowing (Rehg et al., 2008). 
Whistleblowing is not without consequences. It 
has adverse effects on the public confidence in the 
organizations concerned, the profession of the corrupt 
person (Oakley & White, 2006), and the whistleblowers 
(Cortina & Magley, 2003). Rehg et al. (2008) reported that 
whistleblowing was strongly connected with retaliation 
from culprits, which culminated in strained relationships 
between whistleblowers and supervisors. Whistleblowing 
may also have adverse effects on the whistleblowers’ 
access to work-related benefits (Rehg et al., 2008). Studies 
have demonstrated that, apart from perceived helplessness, 
fear of victimization and other risks associated with 
whistleblowing can discourage employees from engaging 
in whistleblowing or reduce whistleblowers’ willingness 
to disclose subsequent corrupt acts (Chassang & Miquel, 
2012; Near, Rehg, Van Scotter & Miceli, 2004). 
In line with the submissions of the social role 
theory and gender expectations (Gutek, 1985) and 
the risks involved in whistleblowing (Rehg et al., 
2008), it is expected that more males would engage in 
whistleblowing than females. This is because females 
are expected to be more acquiescent and less vocal than 
males, even in reporting or protesting immoral acts (Rehg 
et al., 2008). Though studies reported that women were 
expected to exhibit higher ethics of care (Alolo, 2006), 
displayed higher ethical behaviors (Adebayo, 2005), 
and generally less tolerant of, and favorably disposed 
to corruption than men (Swamy, Knack, Lee & Azfer, 
2000), women may engage less in whistleblowing than 
men due to social expectations and the risks involved. 
Rehg et al. (2008, p. 224) opined that “…women who 
blow the whistle behave in a way that is inconsistent 
with their role as women…” They found that women 
suffered more retaliation following whistleblowing than 
men (Rehg et al., 2008). Based on this background, the 
following hypotheses were tested.
Hypothesis 1:   Whistleblowing predicts country’s CPI 
scores. 
Hypothesis 2:   Social  and psychological factors 
discourage majority of the employees 
from blowing the whistle. 
Hypothesis 3:  Majority of males do not blow the 
whistle than females due to social and 
psychological factors.
Hypothesis 4:  M a j o r i t y  o f  m a l e s  e n g a g e  i n 
whistleblowing than females in the last 
12 and half years.
1.  METHODS
1.1  Design and Participants 
This study adopted a cross-sectional survey design. 
The respondents were 536 employees (298 males; 238 
females) sampled from public organizations in 6 States 
in southwestern Nigeria. Their ages averaged 32.13 
(SD=9.78). The inclusion criterion was that the individual 
must have spent, at least, 13 years on the job. This was to 
ensure that the individual’s job tenure covered the period 
of the study (2001 to 2013). 
The respondents were briefed about the aim of the 
study. They were assured that their responses could not 
be traced to them. Participation was purely voluntary 
and questionnaires were distributed only to those who 
were willing to participate in the study. Out of the 550 
questionnaires distributed, 540 were returned, and 4 were 
not duly completed. 
1.2  Measures
Secondary source: Nigeria’s CPI scores from 2001 to 
2012 were obtained from http://www.transparency.org/
research/cpi/overview. The CPI was scored in such that 
low score indicated that the country was highly corrupt 
and high score was a reflection of low level of corruption. 
Before 2012, the CPI scoring format was 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 10 (clean). This was changed to 0 (highly 
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corrupt) to 100 (clean) in 2012 (TI, 2012). In order to 
remove ambiguity in the analysis, Nigeria’s CPI score in 
2012 was divided by 10 to align it with the earlier scoring 
format. The CPI score for 2013 was not included in the 
analysis because it was still underway. 
Primary source: The extent to which respondents 
disclosed corrupt acts was measured using a questionnaire. 
The first section of the questionnaire focused on the 
demographic variables. The second section access how 
often employees reported acts of corruption each year 
between 2001 and 2013 using a 6-point scale (None = 
0; Over 10 times = 5). In the last section, respondents 
indicated the factors that affected their willingness to 
disclose corrupt acts in the last 12 and half years. The 
items of this section were based on factors identified 
by previous studies (Chassang & Miquel, 2012; Near et 
al., 2004; Rehg et al., 2008). Items included: “Perceived 
inability of my report to bring about the desired change 
in the behavior of culprits”, “Fear of attack from 
culprits”, and “Fear of being ostracized (being treated 
as an outcast)”. Based on previous studies on corruption 
in Nigeria (Egwemi, 2012; Enweremadu, 2012; Ezeani, 
2012) and personal interaction with some employees, 
some items that reflected Nigeria’s peculiarity were also 
included. Sample included: “Government’s insensitivity 
to the plight of the citizens”, “Lack of integrity in 
government’s anti-corruption crusades”, “Lack of trust 
in anti-corruption agencies”, “Perceived inefficiency in 
the court process”, and “The stress associated with being 
a witness”. Respondents were free to choose more than 
one reason. The data on this section reflected the number 
of respondents who chose each of the reasons for not 
disclosing corrupt acts in the last 12 and half years.
2.  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
To test hypothesis 1, a simple regression analysis was 
conducted. Percentage of the respondents who engaged in 
whistleblowing from 2001 to 2012 was regressed was on 
Nigeria’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score from 
2001 to 2012. The results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1
Simple Regression on CPI Score (2001–2012)
Predictor β R2 F
Whistleblowing .91* .83 49.58* (df = 1,10)
Note: *all values are significant at .001.
The results in Table 1 indicated that whistleblowing 
significantly predicted CPI score such that whistleblowing 
enhanced the country’s CPI score [β =. 91; R2 = .83; F 
(1,10) = 49.58, p < .001]. This implies that the more the 
percentage of the citizens who engage in whistleblowing 
the better the country’s CPI score. Whistleblowing 
accounted for 83% changes in CPI score. These results 
confirmed hypothesis 1.
As a preliminary analysis to testing hypothesis 2, 
bar charts were constructed in order to determine how 
each of the social and psychological factors discouraged 
whistleblowing and whether there were gender differences 
in the responses of the respondents to each of the factors. 
Figures 1 to 13 show the results of the bar chart.
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 Gender & Corrupt Acts Had no Direct Victim
The results in Figures 1 to 13 generally indicated 
that more employees were discouraged from blowing 
the whistle by social and psychological factors such as 
perceived inability of their reports to bring about the 
desired change in the behavior of corrupt persons, fear 
of being ostracized, perceived government insensitivity, 
inefficient court process, stress associated with being a 
witness. Majority of the respondents also felt discouraged 
from reporting corrupt acts because some of the culprits 
were too powerful. 
Perceived lack of integrity in the anti-corruption 
agencies ,  c lumsiness  of  and ins incer i ty  in  the 
whistleblowing process and channel as well as a feeling 
that corruption had a fluid victim also discouraged most of 
the employees from reporting corrupt act. However, fear of 
attack from culprits, perceived lack of integrity in the anti-
corruption crusades, and fear of being implicated seemed 
did not guarantee whether or not employees would blow 
the whistle. In the case of gender, the graph generally show 
that the social and psychological factors discouraged more 
males than females from reporting corrupt acts.
The graphs in Figures 1 to 13 did not provide enough 
support for hypotheses 2 and 3. Consequently, 13 sets of 
2 (Response category: yes versus no) x 2 (Gender: male 
versus female) Pearson’s Chi Square test were conducted. 
The results are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2
Summary of 2 X 2 χ2 Test on Social and Psychological Factors in Whistleblowing
Response category
Social & psychological factor Gender Yes No df χ2 p
Perceived inability of report to effect desired 
behavioral change
Male 167 (32.7) 110 (21.5)
1 5.22 < .05
Female 156 (30.5) 78 (15.3)
Fear of attack from culprits
Male 141 (27.6) 136 (26.8)
1 .95 > .05
Female 109 (21.3) 125 (24.5)
Perceived government insensitivity to citizens’ 
plights 
Male 159 (31.1) 118 (23.1)
1 .13 > .05
Female 138 (27.0) 96 (18.8)
Fear of being ostracized
Male 189 (37.0) 88 (17.2)
1 6.20 < .05
Female 164 (32.1) 70 (13.7)
Lack of integrity in the anti-corruption crusades
Male 138 (27.0) 139 (27.2)
1 .02 > .05
Female 115 (22.5) 119 (23.3)
Stress associated with being a witness
Male 164 (32.1) 113 (22.1)
1 5.19 < .05
Female 150 (29.4) 84 (16.4)
Lack of trust in anti-corruption agencies
Male 165 (32.3) 112 (21.9)
1 .52 > .05
Female 132 (25.8) 102 (20.0)
Inefficient court process
Male 174 (43.1) 103 (20.2)
1 5.25 < .05
Female 152 (29.7) 82 (16.0)
Clumsiness in the whistleblowing process
Male 205 (40.1) 72 (14.1)
1 6.80 < .05
Female 174 (34.1) 60 (11.7)
Corrupt persons appeared too powerful
Male 191 (37.4) 86 (16.8)
1 6.25 < .05
Female 165 (32.3) 69 (13.5)
Fear of being implicated
Male 154 (30.1) 123 (24.1)
1 1.85 > .05
Female 116 (22.7) 118 (23.1)
Corrupt superiors in whistleblowing channels
Male 155 (30.3) 122 (23.9)
1 .35 > .05
Female 137 (26.8) 97 (19.0)
Corrupt acts had no direct victim 
Male 201 (39.3) 76 (14.9)
1 6.52 < .05
Female 163 (31.9) 71 (13.9)
Note: percentages are in brackets.
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Whistleblowing and Anti-Corruption 
Crusade: Evidence From Nigeria
150
As shown in Table 2, there were significant differences 
in the number of respondents who felt discouraged from 
engaging in whistleblowing in the last 12 and half months 
by some of the social and psychological factors. Most of 
the respondents (63.2%) felt that their whistleblowing 
activities would not bring the desired change in behavior 
[χ2(1) = 5.22, p < .05]. Majority of the respondents (69.1%) 
were discouraged from engaging in whistleblowing because 
of the fear of being ostracized [χ2(1) = 6.20, p < .05]. The 
perceived stress associated with being a witness to corrupt 
acts also discouraged majority of the respondents (61.5%) 
from whistleblowing [χ2(1) = 5.19, p < .05]. Perceived 
inefficiency of the court process was another setback to 
whistleblowing, as 63.8% of the respondents felt so [χ2(1) 
= 5.25, p < .05]. Majority of the respondents (74.2%) felt 
discouraged from engaging in whistleblowing because of 
the perceived clumsiness in the whistleblowing process 
[χ2(1) = 6.80, p < .05]. The feelings that some of the 
corrupt persons were too powerful to be prosecuted was 
another strong factor against whistleblowing, as 69.7% 
of the respondents felt discouraged from blowing the 
whistle because of it [χ2(1)=6.25, p < .05]. Majority of the 
respondents (71.2%) did not engage in whistleblowing 
because of the feelings that corruption had no direct victims 
[χ2(1) = 6.52, p < .05]. 
Six of the 13 social and psychological factors were 
not regarded by majority of the respondents as strong 
discouraging factors in whistleblowing. The factors were 
fear of attack from culprits, perceived government’s 
insensitivity to the plight of the citizens, perceived lack 
of integrity in the anti-corruption crusades, lack of trust 
in the anti-corruption agencies, fear of being implicated, 
and the feelings that there were corrupt superiors in 
whistleblowing channels.
The results in Table 2 indicate no significant gender 
differences in the effects of the social and psychological 
factors in whistleblowing. The implication was that 
female employees were as discouraged as male employees 
from engaging in whistleblowing by those factors. 
Preliminary analysis on hypothesis 4 indicated that 
some cells had expected frequencies that were less than 5. 
Therefore, the response format of the yearly frequency of 
whistleblowing was changed from 6 to 4. The graphical 
representations of the results are shown in Figures 14 to 26.
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The graphs generally indicate that males engaged 
in whistleblowing more than females in last twelve and 
half years, except in 2008 and 2013 where more females 
reported acts of corruption than males. There were 
variations in the yearly frequency of whistleblowing. In 
order to ascertain if the observed gender differences in 
the frequency of reporting corrupt acts in each year were 
significant, 13 sets of 2 (gender: male versus female) x 4 
(frequency of whistleblowing: none, 1 to 4 times, 5 to 10 
times, and over 10 times) Pearson’s Chi Square test were 
conducted to test hypothesis 4. The results are presented 
in Table 3.
Table 3
Summary of 2 X 4 χ2 Test on Gender Differences in Yearly Frequency of Whistleblowing
Year Gender
 Response category
df χ2 p
None 1-4 times 5-10 times Over 10 times
2001
Male 205 52 12 8
3 2.73 > .05
Female 169 44 17 4
2002
Male 204 53 19 1
3 .69 > .05
Female 171 43 18 2
2003
Male 198 57 18 4
3 .55 > .05
Female 172 46 14 2
2004
Male 190 60 22 5
3 2.41 > .05
Female 158 60 14 2
2005
Male 201 46 24 2
3 1.17 > .05
Female 162 47 19 6
2006
Male 180 68 25 4
3 2.51 > .05
Female 148 63 16 7
2007
Male 175 71 27 4
3 1.28 > .05
Female 146 63 19 6
2008
Male 175 72 25 5
3 5.90 > .05
Female 135 81 13 5
2009
Male 170 76 26 5
3 1.90 > .05
Female 139 75 17 3
2010
Male 163 83 24 7
3 .68 > .05
Female 131 77 19 7
2011
Male 166 78 19 7
3 1.11 > .05
Female 134 75 25 8
2012
Male 154 80 35 8
3 .46 > .05
Female 139 66 26 6
2013
Male 169 61 34 13
3 11.31 < .01
Female 123 80 17 12
As shown in Table 3, majority of the employees, 
irrespective gender did not report corrupt acts in their 
organizations. There were no significant gender differences 
in the frequency of whistleblowing from 2001 to 2012. 
However, in the 2013 (January to June) significant gender 
differences occurred in the frequency of whistleblowing 
[χ2 (3) = 11.31, p < .01]. More females (n = 80), compared 
with males (n = 61) reported corrupt acts about 4 times, 
more males (n = 34), compared with females (n = 17) 
reported corrupt acts about 10 times, and the number 
of females who reported corrupt acts over 10 times 
approximated those of males in the first half of 2013. The 
general trend of the results did not provide support for 
hypothesis 4. 
Additional analysis on yearly whistleblowing: 
Generally, it can be deduced from the above results 
that majority of the respondents did not engage in 
whistleblowing in the last 12 and half years. It was 
therefore, necessary to determine the percentage of 
whistleblowing incidence each year. Results indicated that 
2013 seemed to have witnessed the highest incidence of 
whistleblowing. In the first six months of 2013, 42.5% of 
the respondents indicated that they had reported corrupt 
acts, at least, once. This was followed by 2012 with 43.2% 
of the respondents indicating that they reported corrupt 
acts, at least, once that year. Year 2002 witnessed the 
lowest incidence of whistleblowing. Only 26.6% of the 
respondents reported corrupt acts, at least, once in 2002. 
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3.  DISCUSSION
This study investigated the extent to which whistleblowing 
is related with CPI scores. Apart from that, this study 
also aimed to fill the lacuna on factors influencing 
whistleblowing and the extent to which gender differences 
existed in the frequency of whistleblowing in Nigeria. 
Results indicated that country’s CPI scores increased 
with the percentage of individuals who whistle blew 
corrupt acts. Whistleblowing accounted for 83% changes 
in the country’s CPI score. This finding was in consonance 
with the position of TI (2010) that whistleblowing 
was increasingly becoming an important tool in the 
fight against corruption. Oakley and White (2006) also 
submitted that institutional check on corruption might 
not be effective without whistleblowing. For example, 
in 2001, when Nigeria was rated the second most 
corrupt country in the world with a CPI score of 1.0, the 
percentage of individuals who engaged in whistleblowing 
was 26.8. However, the CPI score increased to 2.4 in 2011 
when the percentage of individuals who reported corrupt 
acts increased to 41.3. This might be because increase in 
whistleblowing, apart from checking and discouraging 
corruption, indirectly showed that the citizens do not 
condone corruption.
As regard the factors that discouraged whistleblowing, 
the present study indicated that employees’ feelings 
that their whistleblowing might not lead to the expected 
change in the corruption situation was one of the major 
hindrances to whistleblowing. This finding corroborated 
the submission of Rehg et al. (2008) that individuals 
would be more enthused to report corrupt acts when 
they feel that such report would bring the expected 
change than when they feel otherwise. The prospective 
whistleblowers might have felt that their reports would 
not be significant enough to bring about a dramatic 
change. This might be because corruption seems endemic 
and intractable and the little drop of whistleblowing from 
the employees appeared unimportant.
The present study has identified the fear of being 
ostracized as another important factor discouraging 
employees from whistleblowing corrupt acts. Previous 
studies (e.g. Rehg et al., 2008) reported that lack of support 
from others served as a major hindrance to whistleblowing. 
When whistleblowers do not receive support for reporting 
corrupt acts they feel like an outcast. Employees who do 
not want to be treated as an out-group might be discouraged 
from engaging in whistleblowing, especially if corruption 
is widespread in the organization and whistleblowers are 
ostracized (Cortina & Magley, 2003).
In tandem with previous studies (e.g. Chassang & 
Miquel, 2012; Near et al., 2004), whistleblowing was 
associated with some risks, which may discourage 
whistleblowers from reporting corrupt acts. The present 
study has found that the stress associated with being a 
witness to corrupt acts was another risk to whistleblowers. 
However, fear of being attacked and fear of being 
implicated were not regarded by most of the respondents 
as discouraging factors in whistleblowing. This might be 
because most whistleblowers in Nigeria report corrupt 
acts anonymously. Therefore, fear of attack or being 
implicated might be an issue only when whistleblowers 
disclose their identities; thereby becoming a witness.
The results of the present study show that 63.7% of 
the respondents felt that the corrupt persons were too 
powerful. This was in line with the postulations of the 
resource dependence theory (Near & Miceli, 1987; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978), which posited that whistleblowing may 
not thrive where wrongdoers are more powerful than the 
whistleblowers. This might be because the whistleblowers 
felt that their reports might not enhance the outcome of 
the organization’s fight against corruption but culminate 
in serious consequences for them (Cortina & Magley, 
2003). This may explain why majority of the respondents 
perceived inefficiency in the court process prosecuting 
corrupt individuals and felt that the whistleblowing 
process was clumsy. However, majority of the respondents 
reported that they were not deterred from whistleblowing 
by corrupt superiors in whistleblowing channels. This may 
be because such whistleblowers could blow the whistle 
using external channels (Rehg et al., 2008).
Current study found that when employees felt that 
nobody was directly affected by corruption, they were less 
likely to whistle blow corruption. The reason may be that 
the employees did not feel directly affected by the corrupt 
acts and therefore did not feel obliged to blow the whistle 
(Rehg et al., 2008). 
Perceived government insensitivity to the plights of 
the citizens was not a strong factor in whistleblowing. The 
number of employees who blew the whistle approximated 
those who did not blow the whistle because of perceived 
government insensitivity to the plight of the citizens. That 
is, whether the government was sensitive to the plights of 
the citizens or not employees would blow the whistle. This 
might be because the respondents saw no link between 
corruption and government insensitivity to the plights of 
the citizens. 
Similarly, perceived lack of integrity in the anti-
corruption crusades and trust in the anti-corruption 
agencies were weak factors in whistleblowing among 
employees. This may be because whistleblowers felt 
they could blow the whistle (e.g. through social media) 
irrespective of the activities of the anti-corruption agencies. 
The findings of previous studies (e.g. Rehg et al., 
2008) and the position of the social role theory (Gutek, 
1985), which expected males to be more involved in 
whistleblowing than females were not supported by the 
results of the current study. As indicated in the results, 
there were no gender differences in the effects of the 
social psychological factors on whistleblowing and the 
frequency of whistleblowing. Generally, females blew 
the whistle as males and were as affected as males by 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
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the social and psychological factors when blowing the 
whistle. Females felt as obliged as males to report corrupt 
acts, probably because they felt equally affected by 
corruption and therefore, felt as responsible as males for 
reporting corrupt acts (Rehg et al., 2008).
CONCLUSION
This study has shown that whistleblowing could be 
a viable option to fighting corruption if effectively 
managed. It could enhance a country’s CPI scores; 
indirectly enhance her dignity and foreign investment 
drive. In order to encourage whistleblowing among 
employees, the social and psychological barriers to 
whistleblowing should be removed.
A unique contribution of this study to the literature 
on whistleblowing was the provision an empirical link 
between whistleblowing and country’s CPI score. Apart 
from that, the study has added a new perspective to the 
social role theory (Gutek, 1985) by indicating that females 
could blow the whistle as much as males if they felt the 
corrupt acts had similar direct effect on them.
In spite of the contributions of this study it was not 
without limitations. The study did not cover private 
sector organizations and data was limited to one of the six 
geopolitical zones in Nigeria. Therefore, results may not 
be a true reflection of whistleblowing in the country. The 
hypothesis on the connection between whistleblowing and 
country’s CPI score should be generalized with caution 
because only one country was studied. Future studies 
need to involve public sector organizations, cover more 
geopolitical zones, and compare data from other countries. 
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